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somerfield (this i s sue) calls for a
basic shift in the focus of coping research. He
points to the need for a more systemic con-
ceptualization of stress and coping processes,
the organization of studies of coping around
homogeneous stressors, and the adoption of a
pragmatic, microanalytic approach to both cop-
ing assessment and the analysis of the resulting
data. His examples drawn from the study of
cancer patients facing bone-marrow transplant
highlight the absurdity of organizing coping
assessments around broader questions such as
‘What did you do to cope with your cancer?’ or
even around respondents’ selection of their most
stressful recent experiences in broad categories
such as ‘cancer’ or ‘treatment’. If more
researchers similarly stopped to contemplate
exactly what they were asking of respondents,
fewer studies of coping would be undertaken
with no loss in the accumulation of knowledge. I
can find little with which to disagree in his
article, except his apparent optimism about
coping researchers heeding his highly reason-
able suggestions.
Research using the Revised Ways of Coping
Checklist (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) or instru-
ments derived from it has a life of its own. The
sheer accumulation of studies has set a meth-
odological standard and the mindlessly repeti-
tious use of these instruments has been confused
with the establishment of their validity. Coping
researchers have not yet been deterred by hun-
dreds of studies which tell us little about coping
that is not trivial or misleading. What Somer-
field has to say needs to be said, but I do not
think it will be sufficient to force the razing of
the conceptual and methodological slum which
coping research has become. It is far too easy
for researchers to continue to publish studies
based on the administration of checklists to
diverse and heterogeneous samples with little or
no insight into the predicaments of the individ-
ual respondents who are being considered.
Somerfield opens with a call for a construal of
coping as a ‘dynamic, interactional process’.
This echoes the earliest writings of the Berkeley
Stress and Coping Project (Coyne & Lazarus,
1979; Lazarus & Launier, 1978). The notion of
stress and coping as an interactional (or transac-
tional; see Coyne & Gottlieb, [1996] for a
discussion of the distinction) process remains
largely undeveloped beyond such rhetoric.
Indeed, the persistent assumption that standar-
dized coping checklists are actualizing such a
conceptualization in some meaningful way
stands in the way of a more sober assessment.
The original Ways of Coping (Coyne, Aldwin,
& Lazarus, 1981; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980)
and its revisions (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)
should have been seen as first steps, not the best
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that can be done. They should not have become
the main basis for such a large literature.
Researchers who see the coping literature in
need of fixing and cleaning up rather than razing
can find seemingly helpful bits of advice in
Somerfield’s article (pp. 139–140) as to how to
do this. For instance, ‘Be more careful about
how you instruct respondents to select a stress-
ful episode on which to report.’ If so, the most
fundamental implications of what Somerfield is
saying will be missed. If we take seriously
Somerfield’s notion of a ‘problem-specific sys-
tems model’, we abandon any hope of using a
single checklist measure across situations and
populations. We will need measures tailored to
the specifics of particular problems and what we
hypothesize to be effective strategies for dealing
with them. We also abandon hope of being able
to make many sweeping, unqualified conclu-
sions of the kind that coping researchers are so
fond: ‘Support-seeking was found to be an
ineffective way of coping with X.’ Faithful
adherence to a ‘problem-specific systems
model’ is going to yield mainly context-depend-
ent, highly qualified conclusions. Why does
conventional coping research yield so few con-
clusions which are non-obvious and clinically
useful? It is because it is fundamentally flawed
in its conception and execution. In addition to
the difficulties enumerated by Somerfield and in
the spirit of his article, I suggest the following
(see Coyne & Gottlieb [1996] for an elabora-
tion):
1. Much of the importance of coping for adapta-
tional outcomes is reflected in whether stress-
ful episodes even occur and the particular
details of how they unfold when they do, not
the coping that follows. Life is not a con-
trolled experiment in which stressful encoun-
ters are randomly administered. Much of
the stress with which we must contend and
the options we have for coping depend on the
soundness of our anticipatory coping and
existing routines, the larger circumstances of
our lives and longer term processes such as
the meeting of developmental tasks. Assess-
ment of isolated stressful incidents fail to
capture these factors, but without taking them
into account, we cannot adequately under-
stand what goes on in particular incidents.
2. The standard practice of asking respondents
to complete coping checklists for the most
stressful incident they have faced in a partic-
ular time-frame yields a biased and inac-
curate account of how they cope more
generally. They are being caught when they
are most distressed and very likely at their
worst. Other situations with which they have
coped more effectively are excluded from
assessment precisely because they have
turned out to be less stressful.
3. What is being assessed by a particular coping
scale and the most reasonable interpretation
we can give to scale scores vary across
situations. Consideration of just what coping-
scale scores represent across assessments
leads to the discouraging conclusion that no
consistent interpretation can be given to
relative differences in coping scale scores
across individuals or studies (Coyne & Gott-
lieb, in press).
4. Statistical controls cannot eliminate or com-
pensate for the fundamental differences in the
stressful circumstances that respondents face.
Nor can statistical controls ‘clean’ coping
assessments of such frustrating sources of
differences to produce a pure measure of
coping. To borrow Meehl’s (1970) comments
about the use of statistical controls in similar
circumstances, the practice is ‘fundamentally
defective for many, perhaps most, of the
theoretically significant purposes to which it
has been put’ (p. 374). Controlling for race
does not make African–Americans white or
whites African–American; nor does it make
race irrelevant to respondents’ stress and
coping. Yet, while we can agree on the
absurdity of such specific examples, the field
is reluctant to give up the convention of
attempting to do similar things with statis-
tical controls on a routine basis.
5. Differences in how people cope with super-
ficially similar circumstances cannot be
reduced to differences in their cognitive
appraisals. Yet, that is the simplifying
assumption guiding the reduction and analy-
sis of much coping checklist data. Consider
two women coping with the discovery that
they are pregnant. One is married and she
and her husband have been trying to conceive
for a year. Another is a college freshman who
has been rejected by her first serious boy-
friend. Are the key differences between these
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women in their heads? Reduction of the
complexities of people’s lives to a matter of
cognition is one of the distorting and outright
disrespectful aspects of current coping
research.
6. We cannot get an adequate evaluation of how
people cope in stressful circumstances with-
out taking into account what other persons in
their lives are doing. How others are coping;
how much our respondents can depend on
them; and what others leave to these respon-
dents are crucial determinants of what the
respondents themselves must do to cope
effectively. Current methodologies for study-
ing coping do little to accommodate these
observations. The notion that coping can be
relationship-focused (Coyne & Smith, 1991),
as well as problem- and emotion-focused is
an acknowledgment of some issues, but
hardly sufficient as a solution.
Somerfield’s basic points are well taken, but he
is unlikely to provoke a fresh start to the study
of coping. Perhaps we must wait until it col-
lapses under the weight of dull and obvious
conclusions. Until then, Somerfield’s points are
too inconvenient for those who would otherwise
find refuge in the mass administering of coping
checklists and the analysis and interpretation of
the data according to the conventions estab-
lished in the existing literature.
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mark somerfield thoughtfully dis -
cusses key changes in applying stress and cop-
ing systems theory to research and practice. He
describes some of the pitfalls of trying to test
complete models of adaptation and the limitations
of studies that focus on selected aspects of these
models. Somerfield recommends a third option—
the application of a holistic approach to the study
of a specific problem, in this case adaptation to
treatment-induced sterility in bone-marrow trans-
plantation survivors. In this approach, the theoret-
ical model is used like a multifaceted magnifying
glass to examine the experience of bone-marrow
transplantation survivors in great detail.
Although I like what Somerfield has to say
and resonate to the problems he describes, I
have two concerns with respect to his suggested
approach. The first concern has to do with the
feasibility of its translation into empirical
research. Although matters have been simplified
by focusing the holistic approach on a single
stressful context, that context changes over time
and generates a number of substressors that
require coping and adjustment. Thus, the stress-
ful context is not a monolithic entity, but instead
a dynamic and multifaceted phenomenon. Som-
erfield acknowledges this in his description of
the different types of coping challenge associ-
ated with treatment-related sterility, depending
on the point in the treatment process. A holistic
